Experimental Philosophy of Language?

Some time ago, I found this article from E. Machery (et. al) about the use of “experiments” in philosophy of language. Specifically, the article criticize two arguments given by Kripke in N&N against the descriptivist theory of reference and in favor on the referentialist theory: the Godel argument and Jonah argument. For this blog let’s stick with the Godel argument only. I think there is no need to introduce descriptivism and referentialism here; but maybe it might be useful to review the Godel argument as stated by Kripke.

Suppose that Godel was not in fact the author of [Godel’s] theorem. A man called ‘Schmidt’ (…) actually did the work in question. His friend Godel somehow got hold of the manuscript and it was thereafter attributed to Godel. On the [descriptivist] view in question, then, when our ordinary man uses the name ‘Godel’, he really means to refer to Schmidt, because Schmidt is the unique person satisfying the description ‘the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic’. (…) But it seems we are not. We simply are not. [p. B4 of the linked article and 83-84 of N&N]

The authors of the article presented the Godel argument to 41 undergraduate students from the University of Hong Kong (an English speaking university) and to 31 undergraduate from Rutgers university (you can find the details in the article, p. B6), asking them the following question:

Suppose that John has learned in college that Godel is the author of the Godel’s theorem but that, afterwards, he discovered that Godel in fact stole the theorem from his friend Schmidt; and suppose also that John only knows about Godel that he is the discoverer of Godel’s theorem. When John says “Godel”, he is talking about:

1, the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic? or

2. the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work?

According to Kripke, the majority of the students should have chosen 2.

Surprisingly, while 22/31 Rutgers’ students chose 2 (according to Kripke’s prevision), 23/41 Chinese students (more than half) chose 1. The authors’ conclusion is that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture and that the accordance with the “shared intuitions” does not really prove anything if the relevant intuitions are just pretended to be shared.

All the crucial arguments in N&N rest on the accordance with speakers’ intuitions, in particular the arguments in favor of:

1) essentialism;

2) the causal theory of reference;

3) the rigidity of English names;

Which constitute the bone of Kripke’s general account of language and of his metaphysics. No empirical proof is given for supporting the claim that the intuitions to which 1, 2, 3 are in accordance with are really shared.

Of course, given the result of the experiment we are not entitled to conclude that referentialism is false: other experiments may produce different results, the problem might be related to the formulation of the Godel example, etc. What the experiment shows is that one of the premise of the Godel argument (speakers would normally refer to the Godel when uttering “Godel”) is just assumed to be true, without any justification.

Empirical claims require empirical proofs, we could say. Like Kripke, the vast majority of philosophers does not offer this kind of proof. On the other hand, it seems that experiments are not really part of philosophy: as Williamson said “If anything can be pursued in an armchair, philosophy can” (this quote is referred to in the article too).

It seems to me there are two ways out of the dilemma:

a) go experimental, i.e. move away from armchair and make experiments

b) stay in the armchair and drop all the arguments which require empirical proofs.

It might be required to discard entire areas of research if the option (b) is chosen. For example, a theory of meaning in the sense of Dummett (a theory that explain how speakers understand linguistic expressions) would be dropped out of philosophy. On the other hand, go for (a) requires a revision of the very idea of philosophy – or, at least, of the idea of philosophy expressed in the quote from Williamson

The most interesting aspect is that it seems there are no ways out of the dilemma; i.e., I see no options apart from (a) and (b). So, philosophers really needs to choose one of the two.

What do you think about this? Are there other relevant options? And if not, you think philophers should stay in the armchair?